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25 August 1978

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Guidelines

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Liaison and Oversight Control, Policy and Coordination Staff, DDO

25X1 FROM:

Assistant Legislative Counsel

SUBJECT: Senate Foreign Relations International Operations (McGovern) Subcommittee Investigation of Foreign Intelligence Activities in the United States

25X1 1. ☐ Chairman George McGovern (D., S. Dak.) has announced that the International Operations Subcommittee plans to hold hearings shortly in connection with its ongoing investigation of the activities of foreign intelligence services in the U.S. The Agency will certainly be asked to testify, and I believe it would be wise for us to plan now for this eventuality.

25X1 2. ☐ As you know, we have consistently tried to impress upon Subcommittee staffers Michael Glennon and John Ritch the fact that the Agency is by statute and Executive Order specifically denied any domestic police, law enforcement, or internal security functions. We have also pointed out to the Subcommittee that its specific concern with alleged harassment of U.S. residents by foreign intelligence services is particularly the province of other Government departments.

25X1 3. ☐ Nevertheless, I believe that the Agency's witness at the Subcommittee's hearings must be prepared to respond to the following line of questioning:

--Recognizing the proscriptions on the Agency that exist in the internal security field, is it not true that the Agency sometimes develops information on foreign intelligence activities in the U.S. through its sources overseas, or becomes aware of such activities via disseminations from the FBI and NSA? If so;

--Why doesn't the Agency use its influence with foreign intelligence services with which it has liaison relationships to put a stop to harassment of U.S. residents and various other kinds of undesirable activities? Are there explicit or implicit understandings between the CIA and these liaison services regarding unilateral operations in one another's country? Does the Agency ever ask the FBI not to take action regarding particular instances of foreign intelligence service activity in the U.S. because of such an understanding?

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--Is there a significant difference between the Agency's attitude toward: (1) operations run by a foreign intelligence service against a third country in the U.S.; and (2) foreign intelligence service harassment of U.S. residents? What does the Agency do when it becomes aware of the first type of operation? Does the Agency's attitude in such cases depend on the countries involved?

25X1 4. ☐ The answers to some of these questions overlap with the CIA comments you drafted on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report entitled "Activities of 'Friendly' Foreign Intelligence Services in the United States: A Case Study." (The recommendations and conclusions section of this report were to have been discussed by the NSC/SCC sometime after 15 July; has this meeting taken place?) The Subcommittee's concerns also relate to ongoing negotiations with the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence regarding reporting to the Committee on the CIA's liaison relationships. I believe the DDO should be thinking about the drafting of testimony for a prospective Agency witness before the McGovern Subcommittee that will be responsive to the line of questioning indicated above and in keeping with our views on disclosing the specifics of the Agency's liaison relationships to the Legislative Branch. The McGovern Subcommittee is focusing on activities in the U.S. by the intelligence services of Iran, Chile, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Yugoslavia.

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